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A New Challenge to Miranda: Evaluating the
Effectiveness of Mid-Interrogation Miranda
Warnings and the Admissibility of Subsequent
Confessions: Missouri v. Seibert
DUE PROCESS - FIFTH AMENDMENT - PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION - MIRANDA: The Supreme Court held that, in a
continual custodial interrogation, when Miranda warnings are
given after a suspect has confessed they do not effectively protect
the privilege against self-incrimination and that any subsequent
confessions made should be suppressed.
Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004).
When Patrice Seibert awoke on February 12, 1997, she found
that her son Jonathan had died in his sleep.1 Jonathan was af-
flicted with cerebral palsy.2 Seibert feared that she would be ac-
cused of neglecting him due to the bedsores on his body.3 While in
her company, two of Seibert's older sons and a pair of their friends
discussed a plan to hide the circumstances of Jonathan's death by
burning down the family trailer.4 The plan also included leaving
Donald Rector, a mentally ill teenager living with Seibert, in the
trailer as well, so that it would appear that the severely handi-
capped Jonathan had not been left alone.5 In accordance with the
plan, Seibert's son Darian and one of his friends set the fire later
that afternoon and Donald Rector died.6
1. Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2605 (2004).
2. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2605.
3. Id.
4. Id. Upon the discovery that Jonathan was dead, Seibert's son Michael was sent to
find his older brother Darian. State v. Seibert, No. 23729, 2002 WL 114804, at *1 (Mo. Ct.
App. Jan. 30, 2002). Darian was at his friend Derrick Roper's house where the two of them
and another friend, Jeremy Batcher, had been drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana.
Id. Darian initially told his mother to call the police and then he returned to Roper's house,
but Michael again asked him to return to the trailer after Seibert refused to call the police
because she was afraid of being charged with neglecting Jonathan. Id. This was when the
plan was first devised and when Seibert gave Darian and Roper money to buy gasoline to
set the fire. Id.
5. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2605-06. The group chose Donald because they knew that he
was on medication that normally caused him to take a nap after school. State v. Seibert,
2002 WL 114804, at *1.
6. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2606.
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Five days later, while at the hospital where Darian was under-
going treatment for burns, Seibert was arrested.7 Seibert was not
given Miranda8 warnings at the time of her arrest.9 After her ar-
rival at the police station, Seibert was left alone for approximately
twenty minutes before Officer Hanrahan began to interrogate
her."0 After almost forty minutes of questioning, Seibert stated
that she knew Donald was supposed to die in the fire." She was
given a twenty minute break to smoke a cigarette and have some
coffee. 2 When she returned, Hanrahan turned on a tape recorder,
administered Miranda warnings to Seibert, and Seibert signed a
waiver of rights." Hanrahan resumed the interrogation with a
reference to the earlier conversation, then confronted Seibert with
the statements she had made minutes earlier and she confessed a
second time."
Seibert was charged with first-degree murder for the death of
Donald Rector. 5 A suppression hearing was held, in which Seibert
attempted to have both of her confessions excluded. 6 Officer Han-
rahan testified that he intentionally withheld the Miranda warn-
ings. 7 The trial court suppressed Seibert's pre-warning statement
but allowed the jury to hear the confession she made after the
warnings were given. 8 Seibert was convicted of second-degree
murder. '"
7. Id. Darian had fallen asleep while Roper was preparing the trailer for the fire, and
he awoke as gasoline was being poured on him. State v. Seibert, 2002 WL 114804, at *2.
The trailer caught fire before Darian got out. Id.
8. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Supreme Court held that police offi-
cers are required to inform a suspect of his rights to silence and assistance of counsel prior
to any custodial interrogation. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 437.
9. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2606. The hospital where Darian was treated was in St.
Louis, outside the jurisdiction of Officer Hanrahan, the Rolla, Missouri officer who was
investigating the trailer fire. State v. Seibert, 2002 WL 114804, at *4. Hanrahan arranged
to have a St. Louis officer arrest Seibert and specifically advised that officer not to give her
Miranda warnings. Id.
10. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2606.
11. Id. During this initial questioning, Officer Hanrahan continually squeezed




15. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2606.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 2606. Officer Hanrahan acknowledged that the goal of this question-first
technique was to obtain a confession, give the warnings, and then repeat the questions
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The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.20 The
Supreme Court of Missouri reversed." It held that Elstad was
distinguishable from this case, focusing on the seemingly continu-
ous nature of the interrogation to which Seibert was exposed and
the intentional withholding of Miranda warnings by Officer Han-
rahan.2  The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari23 to
decide the issue of whether mid-interrogation Miranda warnings,
given after a suspect has confessed, effectuate the purposes of the
warning.24
Justice Souter wrote the plurality opinion of the Court.25 Part II
of the opinion began with a recitation of Miranda and its underly-
ing mandate. 26  The Court then noted that while failure to give
Miranda warnings and get a waiver usually requires the exclusion
20. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2606. That court ruled that the facts of Seibert's case were
indistinguishable from those of Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985). In Elstad, while
officers were arresting the defendant in his home, one officer made a statement that he
believed that the defendant was involved in a robbery, and Elstad stated that he was in fact
present at the time the robbery took place. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 301. Upon arrival at the
police station Elstad was advised of his Miranda rights, he signed a waiver and made a
confession regarding his participation in the robbery. Id. at 301-02. The court excluded the
statement Elstad made in his home but allowed the confession made at the police station to
be admitted, holding that it was freely given and in no way tainted by his previous admis-
sion. Id. at 302.
21. Missouri v. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d 700 (Mo. 2002).
22. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2606-07. The Missouri Supreme Court stated that the essen-
tial issue was whether the presumed involuntariness of the first statement carried over to
the second statement. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d at 701. In holding that the involuntariness did
carry over to the second confession the court ruled that the intentional withholding of
Miranda warnings had the purpose of weakening Seibert's ability to exercise her rights.
Id. at 705. The court also held that the circumstances of the two confessions must be con-
sidered, namely the temporal and spatial proximity of the second confession to the first. Id.
The majority stated that if there is sufficient time between the unwarned and warned con-
fessions, then it is more likely that the accused voluntarily chose to confess the second time.
Id. This court found that no such separation occurred and, in fact, Seibert's interrogation
was nearly continuous. Id. at 705-06.
23. Certiorari is "[a]n extraordinary writ issued by an appellate court, at its discretion,
directing a lower court to deliver the record in the case for review." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 220 (7th ed. 1999).
24. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2607. The Court noted that "the threshold issue.., is thus
whether it would be reasonable to find that in these circumstances the warnings could
function 'effectively' as Miranda requires." Id. at 2610.
25. Id. at 2605. The plurality consisted of Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg and
Breyer. Id. Justice Breyer wrote a concurring opinion and Justice Kennedy also wrote an
opinion concurring in the judgment. Id. Justice O'Connor wrote the dissenting opinion in
which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas joined. Id.
26. Id. at 2607-08. Part I of the plurality opinion was a recitation of the facts and pro-
cedural history. Id. at 2605-07. Justice Souter recounted that Miranda, with the purpose
of restricting those interrogation practices that hinder a suspect's ability to make a rational
decision regarding his right to remain silent, requires that an individual be "adequately
and effectively" made aware of his rights. Id. at 2608 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467).
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of any statement made by a suspect, a proper application of such
warnings and obtaining a waiver almost always results in admis-
sibility.27 According to the plurality, this outcome is the natural
result of the fact that Miranda warnings are most often given as
they were intended; at a time when the accused still has a real
choice to remain silent. 8
In the next part of the opinion, the plurality addressed the vol-
untariness of the statements.29  The Court recalled that after
Miranda was decided, Congress attempted to bypass it with legis-
lation that would allow for the voluntariness to be litigated, rather
than presumed based on warnings. 0 Justice Souter stated that
the technique of questioning suspects, warning them, and then
continuing the interrogation presented a fresh challenge to
Miranda .31
According to the Court, when the confession at issue is obtained
under these circumstances, the conflicting objectives of Miranda
and question-first must be weighed.2 The plurality held that the
essential inquiry is whether Miranda warnings given in the mid-
dle of an interrogation could realistically alert a suspect to his
right of silence, even if he had made previous statements .
3  Jus-
tice Souter stated that if a suspect is not in a position to make an
informed choice after mid-interrogation warnings, then there is no
justification for holding the warnings as valid according to
Miranda, nor is there justification for treating the second stage of
the interrogation as separate from the first, unwarned stage.'
The Court ruled that when the circumstances of this case are
viewed objectively, warnings given only after the suspect has con-
fessed are unlikely to sufficiently prepare the suspect to exercise
27. Seibert, 124 S. Ct at 2608. The Court noted that "maintaining that a statement is
involuntary even though given after warnings and voluntary waiver of rights requires




30. Id. Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501, but it was declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court's decision in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
31. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2608. There was testimony at trial that this question-first
technique was not limited to the Rolla, Missouri police department but was in fact gaining
popularity and was being taught by a national police training unit. Id. at 2608-09.
32. Id. at 2609. The Court stated that the objective of Miranda is to insure that police
interrogations do not undermine an individual's ability to make an informed decision re-
garding his or her choice to talk or remain silent, while the purpose of question-first is to
acquire the initial confession, thereby rendering Miranda warnings futile. Id. at 2609-10.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 2610.
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his rights in subsequent interrogation.3' The more likely result,
according to the plurality, is that telling a suspect that they have
the right to remain silent after they have just confessed would
leave them confused, and confusion is not a suitable mindset for
making a well-informed decision. 6
In the final part of the opinion, the Court addressed the State of
Missouri's contention that under the principles of Oregon v. El-
stad,37 the confession should be admissible.3 8  The plurality held
that this case was not governed by Elstad because the cases are
factually distinguishable." Justice Souter wrote that a compari-
son of Elstad to the present case reveals a series of factors that
may determine whether the post-confession Miranda warnings
effectively achieved their purpose." The Court, applying these
factors, compared the two cases and found them to be on opposite
ends of the spectrum.4 Upon this finding, the Court ruled that the
question-first technique used on Seibert undermined the purpose
of Miranda and held that the warnings given to her minutes after
35. Id. The Court noted that the reason for the popularity of the question-first tech-
nique is that it succeeds in eliciting confessions that would not have been made if the sus-
pect fully understood his rights from the beginning. Id. at 2610-11.
36. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2611. The Court also pointed out that it is perfectly reason-
able for a suspect to infer that his silence will not help him when he is told that anything
he says can be used against him and the confession he just made is not excused. Id. Fur-
ther, the plurality held that since Miranda warnings given under these circumstances
undermine the suspect's ability to make an informed decision, it would be "unrealistic" to
find the two halves of a coordinated and ongoing interrogation as separate and distinct
simply because the warnings were given in the middle. Id.
37. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
38. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2611.
39. Id. at 2611-12. Justice Souter particularly focused on the Elstad Court's finding
that the failure to provide Miranda warnings initially was an "oversight." Id. at 2611
(quoting Elstad, 470 U.S. at 315-16). In Seibert, however, the interrogating officer's failure
to give Miranda warnings was intentional. Id. at 2612-13.
40. Seibert, 124 S. Ct at 2612-13. Those factors were:
[The completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the first round of in-
terrogation, the overlapping content of the two statements, the timing and setting of
the first and the second, the continuity of police personnel, and the degree to which
the interrogator's questions treated the second round as continuous with the first.
Id. at 2612.
41. Id. at 2612-13. The Court specifically noted that the interrogations in Elstad oc-
curred in distinctly different locations (the defendant's home and the police station) and
that there was a significant time lapse between the two. Id. at 2612. In Seibert's case,
however, the interrogations were nearly continuous, they took place in the same location,
they were executed by the same officer, and that officer made specific references to Seibert's
previous confession. Id. at 2612-13.
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her initial invalid confession were ineffective. 4' Therefore, the
post-Miranda confession was inadmissible.43
Justice Breyer concurred with the result of the plurality opin-
ion.44 According to Justice Breyer, absent a showing that the fail-
ure to warn was in good faith, any statements or confessions
which ultimately result from an unwarned interrogation ought to
be excludec.- Justice .breyer espousea tis to De a siimpie rule
that courts could easily follow and advocated the need for a less
complex rule. 6
Justice Kennedy authored a concurring opinion, which Justice
Breyer also joined.47 Justice Kennedy wrote that Elstad reached
the correct result and that the Court was justified in focusing on
the good faith mistake of the arresting officer.48 Because the offi-
cer in this case deliberately attempted to circumvent the protec-
tions of Miranda, Justice Kennedy believed that the plurality's
decision was correct. 9 Justice Kennedy stated, however, that the
objective "effectiveness" test of the plurality was too broad a stan-
dard because it would be applied to both intentional and uninten-
tional Miranda violations."0 Justice Kennedy advocated that the
plurality's analysis should be applied on a more limited basis
when intentional violations are involved, and that Elstad should
continue to govern the admissibility of post-warning statements.5'
Justice O'Connor began her dissent by agreeing with the plural-
ity that the "fruit of the poisonous tree" theory52 does not apply in
this case, and that the subjective intent of the interrogating officer
should not be used as a factor." Justice O'Connor wrote in dis-
42. Id. at 2613.
43. Id.
44. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
45. Seibert, 124 S. Ct at 2613 (Breyer, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 2613-14 (Breyer, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 2614 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 2615 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
49. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
50. Seibert, 124 S. Ct at 2616 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
51. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy also wrote, however, that when the
violation of Miranda is intentional, courts should look to see whether any curative meas-
ures were applied to cure the taint of the violation. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Such
curative measures might include a significant time lapse between statements or a declara-
tion to the suspect that their previous statements are likely to be inadmissible. Id. (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring).
52. The fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine is "[the rule that evidence derived from an
illegal search, arrest, or interrogation is inadmissible because the evidence was tainted by
the illegality." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 678 (7th ed. 1999).
53. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Seibert argued that her post-warning confession
should have been excluded under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, but the plurality
Vol. 43304
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sent, however, because she believed that the plurality's result
adopted an argument that the Supreme Court had expressly re-
jected in Elstad." Justice O'Connor argued that the proper analy-
sis would subject the interrogation to the voluntariness standards
of the Fifth Amendment, which were reinforced by Elstad."5 Un-
der this analysis, if Seibert's first statement is found involuntary
then the Court can determine whether the taint was mitigated
through curative measures or changed circumstances." Accord-
ingly, Seibert's second statement should only be excluded if the
Court finds that it was involuntary even though Miranda warn-
ings had been given."
Prior to Miranda, there was not a decision by the United States
Supreme Court that required police to inform the accused of his
rights of silence and assistance of counsel as constitutional pre-
requisites to admissibility of statements made by the accused at
trial.58 The admissibility of confessions was evaluated under the
voluntariness test, which the Court developed from the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.59
In 1966, The Supreme Court decided Miranda v. Arizona,6" in
which it consolidated four cases dealing with the same issue: the
admissibility of statements made by suspects during custodial in-
terrogations.61 The Court held that statements made by a defen-
dismissed this argument and ruled that Elstad rejected it. Id. at 2610 n.4. With regard to
her statement that the subjective intent of the interrogating officer should not be a factor,
Justice O'Connor wrote that in order for the intentional deception of the interrogating
officer to have affected the voluntariness of the suspect's waiver of rights, the suspect
would have to know of the officer's intent. Id. at 2617-18 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 2619 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). According to Justice O'Connor, the Supreme
Court rejected the position taken by the Court of Appeals of Oregon in Elstad that "the
coercive impact of the unconstitutionally obtained statement remains, because in a defen-
dant's mind it has sealed his fate." Id (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Elstad,
658 P.2d 552, 554 (Or. Ct. App. 1983)). Justice O'Connor repeated the Court's position in
Elstad, stating that if the Court gave constitutional protection to the psychological effect of
"let[ting] the cat out of the bag," then suspects would be virtually immune to the conse-
quences of their subsequent, warned confessions. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
55. Seibert, 124 S. Ct at 1629 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
56. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
57. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
58. E. H. Shopler, Annotation, Necessity of Informing Suspect of Rights Under Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, Prior to Police Interrogation, 10 A.L.R. 3d 1054, 1057 (2004).
59. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 433.
60. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
61. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439. The first of the four cases joined in this opinion was
Miranda v. Arizona. Id. at 491. In Miranda the defendant, Ernesto Miranda, was con-
victed of kidnapping and rape. Id. at 492. He was arrested, identified by the complaining
witness, and then interrogated for two hours without being advised that he had the right to
an attorney. Id. at 491. When it affirmed his conviction, the Supreme Court of Arizona
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dant while under custodial interrogation 62 may not be used against
him at trial, unless the prosecution proved that certain procedural
safeguards were implemented to insure that the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination was protected.3 The Court
mandated that it was essential that the protections provided in
the Constitution be more than words, and so in order for the privi-
lege against self-incrimination to carry full force, a suspect must
be made aware of his right to silence." The Court concluded that
the judgments in three of the four cases consolidated in this opin-
ion were reversed.6
As a result of the decision in Miranda, Congress passed 18
U.S.C § 3501.66 This statute was a congressional attempt to over-
focused on the fact that Miranda never requested counsel. Id. at 492. The second case was
Vignera v. New York, in which the defendant was taken to three different police stations
and questioned in regard to a robbery. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 493. At trial, the prosecution
objected to defense counsel's question to Vignera as to whether he was informed of his right
to counsel. Id. at 493. The objection was sustained and Vignera ultimately was convicted.
Id. at 493-94. In the third case, Westover v. United States, the defendant was questioned by
the Kansas City police at night and again the following day regarding a robbery and a
felony charge he was wanted for in California. Id. at 494-95. After an additional two to
two and a half hours of questioning by the FBI, Westover signed two confessions and was
later convicted at trial. Id. at 495. In the final of the four cases, California v. Stewart, the
defendant was held for five days and questioned nine times in connection with a series of
robberies. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 497. After the last interrogation, Stewart confessed and
the transcript of that confession was read at trial. Id. at 497-98. Stewart was convicted;
however, the Supreme Court of California reversed, holding that Stewart should have been
made aware of his rights. Id. at 498.
62. The Court defined custodial interrogation as 'questioning initiated by law enforce-
ment officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his free-
dom of action in any significant way." Id. at 444.
63. Id. at 444. Those procedural safeguards mandate that a "fully effective" warning be
issued that the suspect has the right to remain silent, that any statements made may be
used against him, that he has the right to an attorney, and that an attorney will be ap-
pointed if he cannot afford one. Id.
64. Id. The Court concluded that without safeguards, such as warnings issued prior to
custodial interrogation, it cannot be said that any statement given was the product of the
defendant's free will. Id. at 458. The Court came to this conclusion, that no unwarned
confessions can be said to have been freely given, by evaluating the psychologically coercive
effect of police interrogation practices such as incommunicado interrogation (where the
defendant is isolated from anyone who might provide support) and giving the defendant
false information to make him believe that there is more evidence against the defendant
than truly exists. Id. at 445-58. The Court held that it would no longer inquire into the
voluntariness of statements made, as it did in the past. Id. at 468. The Court announced
that from now on it will presume that a defendant is not aware of his rights until he is
given the proper warnings. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468.
65. Id. at 499. The convictions of defendants Miranda, Vignera, and Westover were
reversed and the Court affirmed the Supreme Court of California's reversal of Stewart's
conviction. Id. The Court found that none of the statements obtained in the four cases met
the constitutional standards for protection of the privilege against self incrimination. Id. at
491.
66. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 reads, in relevant part:
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rule Miranda; however, the question of its ultimate success in do-
ing so was not answered until the statute was finally invoked in
Dickerson.67 The issue presented to the Supreme Court in
Dickerson was whether Congress had constitutional authority to
supersede Miranda's requirement of pre-interrogation warnings. 8
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the holding of the Court, which
said that Miranda did announce a constitutional rule, and Con-
gress did not have the authority to overrule it.69 The Court looked
to the language of the Miranda opinion in order to determine
whether the Miranda Court thought that it was announcing a
constitutional rule. ° Chief Justice Rehnquist then stated that, as
the Court did find that Miranda announced a constitutional rule
that replaced the traditional totality-of-the-circumstances volun-
tariness test, the statute seeking to reinstate that test must be
invalidated if Miranda continues to be the law.71 As a result of the
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District of Co-
lumbia, a confession ... shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given...
(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into account
consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, includ-
ing (1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant . . . (2)
whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with which he was charged or
of which he was suspected at the time of making the confession, (3) whether or not
such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to make any statement
and that any such statement could be used against him, (4) whether or not such de-
fendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of coun-
sel; and (5) whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel
when questioned and when giving such confession.
18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1968). "The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to
be taken into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntari-
ness of the confession." 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a)(b).
67. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 437. Dickerson was charged for several offenses in connec-
tion with a bank robbery. Id. at 432. Dickerson moved to suppress a statement he made on
the grounds that he had not been given Miranda warnings and the district court granted
that motion. Id. The Government appealed and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that under 18 U.S.C. § 3501 the statement was voluntarily made. Id.
The court of appeals then concluded that Miranda was not a constitutional holding, thus
the statute prevailed and the court reversed the suppression order. Id. at 432.
68. Id. at 437.
69. Id. at 444.
70. Id. at 439. Chief Justice Rehnquist began this inquiry by noting that the opinion of
Miranda begins with a statement that the Court was going to "give concrete constitutional
guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow." Id. (quoting Miranda, 384
U.S. at 441-42). The Court then noted the language of Miranda, which stated that the
circumstances of that case 'did not meet the constitutional standards for protection of the
privilege." Id. at 440. (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 491). The Court also pointed out the
Miranda Court's ruling that Congress could take legislative action to protect the constitu-
tional privilege. Id.
71. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 442-43. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that stare decisis
"weighed heavily against overruling [Miranda] now." Id. at 443. Stare decisis is '[tihe
doctrine of precedent, under which it is necessary for a court to follow earlier judicial deci-
307
308 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 43
Court's reaffirmation of Miranda in Dickerson, the admissibility at
trial of statements made by an accused during interrogation re-
mains dependent upon the existence of pre-interrogation warn-
ings.72
In 1985, the Supreme Court decided the case of Oregon v. El-
stad.7 3 The issue in Elstad was whether the failure of an interro-
gating officer to issue Miranda warnings rendered subsequent
statements, made after Miranda warnings were administered and
a waiver of rights obtained, inadmissible. 4 The Court ruled that a
suspect who had previously responded to unwarned, but non-
coercive, questioning was not disabled from subsequently waiving
his rights and making a valid confession after being given
Miranda warnings.75 The Court dealt first with the argument for
suppression that the statement should be excluded under the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine." The Court rejected this
argument and noted that the difference between the "fruits" ex-
clusionary rule and the Miranda exclusionary rule is that
Miranda warnings themselves, unlike the Fourth Amendment's
protection against illegal search and seizure, are not protected
constitutional rights.77 The second argument that the Court re-
sions when the same points arise again in litigation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1414 (7th
ed. 1999). After noting that "special justification" is necessary to overcome stare decisis,
the Court held that it did not find such justification in this case. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at
443. The Court held that although Miranda has drawbacks, it is simpler than the volun-
tariness test revived in 18 U.S.C. § 3501 for adherence by police officers. Id. at 444.
72. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444.
73. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
74. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 303. Michael Elstad was arrested at his home for the robbery of
a neighbor's house. Id. at 300. While in the house, one of the arresting officers stated that
he believed Elstad was involved in the robbery, to which Elstad replied "I was there." Id. at
301. About an hour later, Elstad was advised of his Miranda rights; he waived those rights
and signed a typed confession. Id. The trial court suppressed the statement Elstad made
while in his house but admitted the typed confession into evidence. Id. at 302. The Oregon
Court of Appeals reversed Elstad's conviction, holding that the taint of the first conviction
was not sufficiently dissipated by an adequate passage of time. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 303.
The Oregon Supreme Court declined review and the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari after a petition from the State of Oregon. Id.
75. Id at 307.
76. Id. at 303.
77. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 304-05. Instead, the Court noted, "Miranda warnings... are
measures to insure that the [constitutional] right against compulsory self-incrimination [is]
protected." Id. at 305 (quoting New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984)). The Court
furthered this rationale by stating that failure to give Miranda warnings creates a pre-
sumption of compulsion, and although the inadmissibility of those statements cannot be
cured, the presumption is overcome with regard to later statements when they are made
after an informed waiver of rights. Id. at 307-09. The presumption is only that the privi-
lege against self incrimination has not been intelligently waived, not that the statements
were actually coerced. Id. at 310.
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jected was the psychological effect of "let[ting] the cat out of the
bag."78 The Court held that if this argument were accepted, then a
suspect would be given too much protection from the consequences
of his subsequent statements made after an informed waiver of
rights. 9 The Court specifically noted that the rule from Miranda
was in no way affected by this decision, but it held that there was
no necessity for presuming a coercive effect with regard to the
warned statements if the initial statements were voluntary, al-
though technically in violation of Miranda.s0 As a result, the
Court concluded that the Court of Appeals of Oregon's decision
was reversed.8'
Since Elstad, there has been a split in the circuit courts as to
how Elstad should be applied, and that was the reason that the
Supreme Court decided to grant certiorari in the case against
Patrice Seibert. 2 In United States v. Carte the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit was faced with a mid-
interrogation Miranda warning scenario.84 The Court ruled that
the Elstad argument, although not raised in the district court, did
not require reversal. 5 The Court came to that conclusion after
distinguishing the facts of Elstad from what happened to Carter.86
78. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 311. The "cat" argument was that once a confession is made the
psychological effect of that cannot be overcome. Id.
79. Id. at 312. The Court also noted that "the causal connection between any psycho-
logical disadvantage created by his admission and his ultimate decision to cooperate is
speculative and attenuated at best." Id. at 313-14.
80. Id. at 317-18. The Court noted that the Fourteenth Amendment due process volun-
tariness test remains the standard for determining voluntariness of an unwarned state-
ment even though the admissibility of that statement is now governed by Miranda. Id. at
308-09.
81. Id. at 318.
82. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2607.
83. 884 F.2d 368 (8thCir. 1989).
84. Carter, 884 F.2d. at 369. The defendant Carter was discovered to have stolen some
marked bills and a bearer check from the bank where he worked. Id. Upon this discovery,
he was interrogated in the bank manager's office by two inspectors. Id. After forty-five
minutes of interrogation, Carter complied with a request to search his wallet in which were
found the marked bills. Id. Carter was then given Miranda warnings, he signed a waiver
and wrote out a confession. Id. at 369. At trial the district court granted Carter's motion to
suppress the statements and the physical evidence. Carter, 884 F.2d at 369. The district
court ruled that the interrogation was a custodial setting and Miranda warnings should
have been given. Id.
85. Id. at 372.
86. Id. at 373. Of particular note to the Court was the fact that in Elstad there was a
significant passage of time between the voluntary, though unwarned, confession and the
warned confession, whereas here no such passage of time existed. Id. at 373. The Court
also noted that there was a concern in Elstad that Miranda violations may occur when the
police erroneously determine whether or not a suspect is in custody and that concern could
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The Court found that, applying the voluntariness test of the due
process clause, both the initial and subsequent warned confessions
were involuntary despite the warnings, and also found that Elstad
did not establish a rule permitting an "end run" around Miranda.7
A similar interpretation of Elstad was reached in United States
v. Gale.8 In Gale, the defendant made three statements prior to
being given Miranda warnings and one after.89 The district court
ruled that under the rule in Elstad, the statement made after
Miranda warnings were given was admissible. ° The Court re-
jected Gale's argument that he was subjected to the "intimidating
and inherently coercive" practices contemplated in Elstad when he
gave his second and third statements such that his fourth state-
ment, though given after Miranda warnings, should be sup-
pressed.9' Gale also argued that the ruling in Carter required the
exclusion of his fourth statement.92 The Court rejected this argu-
ment as well, noting that unlike in Carter, the statement Gale
made after Miranda warnings were issued was significantly later
in time than his previous statements. 93 The Court clearly stated
that it was not condoning the officer's failure to give Miranda
warnings, but concluded that since the unwarned, suppressed
statements were voluntarily made, no "end run" around Miranda
not have been present in Carter for it was must have been clear that the interrogation of
Carter was custodial. Id.
87. Id. at 373. The Court also noted that the decision in Miranda was influenced by
dissatisfaction with case-by-case determinations of voluntariness. Id. at 374. According to
the Court, the ease of Miranda's application is one of its advantages and if it were to permit
this "end run" around Miranda then courts would be back to performing case-by-case
evaluations. Id.
88. 952 F.2d 1412 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
89. Gale, 952 F.2ct at 1414. Gale was stopped by an officer who had received a tip from
an informant that Gale was in possession of drugs. Id. at 1413. While in his car, Gale
admitted to the officer that he had drugs. Id. at 1414. After he was ordered out of the car,
Gale then admitted to having drugs in his crotch and in the trunk of his car. Id. Gale was
then taken to the police station, and fifty minutes after the original stop he was given
Miranda warnings, waived his rights, and admitted that he intended to sell the drugs. Id.
at 1414.
90. Id. The district court granted Gale's suppression motion with regard to the first
three, unwarned statements but found that since those three statements were not coerced,
the fourth statement was admissible according to the rule announced in Elstad. Id.
91. Id. at 1417. The Court's reasoning for rejecting Gale's argument was that every
post-arrest interrogation is inherently coercive, but Elstad required actual coercion in order
to find the post-warning statements involuntary. Id. The Court found no support in the
record to suggest that the district court's ruling that no such actual coercion took place was
in error. Id.
92. Id. at 1417.
93. Id at 1418.
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was present; therefore, the fourth statement made by Gale was
admissible. '
United States v. Esquilin, decided in 2000, also involved state-
ments made before and after Miranda warnings were issued.95 At
trial, Esquilin sought suppression of all statements he made, even
though the Government did not seek admission of the pre-warning
statements.96 The district court denied the motion.97 Esquilin ar-
gued on appeal that Elstad required a time lapse between the un-
warned and warned statements, and that that element was not
present in this case.9" The Court rejected this argument and
stated that the lapse of time considered in Elstad is only relevant
as a factor when the statement was actually coerced.99 Esquilin's
next argument was that the deliberate withholding of Miranda
warnings by the police constituted a per se "improper tactic,"
which required a presumption of compulsion regarding the
warned statement."' In rejecting this argument, the Court noted
that Elstad should be read on the whole, and that "deliberately
coercive or improper tactics" are two ways of describing the same
type of conduct. 1' The Court concluded that the district court was
correct in ruling that Esquilin's post-warning statements were
admissible." 2
The same issue, whether a confession made after Miranda
warnings were given should be suppressed because of statements
94. Gale, 952 F.2d at 1418. The Court found that the principles of Elstad were not
violated in this case because the first three statements, though technically in violation of
Miranda, were voluntary under the due process test and thus did not affect the voluntari-
ness of the post-Miranda statement. Id. at 1417.
95. 208 F.3d 315 (1st Cir. 2000). In Esquilin, police were notified of possible drug activ-
ity occurring at a motel by the motel manager. Esquilin, 208 F.3d. at 316. When they
arrived, Esquilin consented to an officer and a drug-sniffing dog entering his room to ask
him a few questions. Id. at 317. Esquilin then consented to a search of his room and the
dog found a plastic bag containing white powder, which Esquilin admitted was cocaine. Id.
After his arrest, a Maine Drug Enforcement Agency officer took over and was told that
Esquilin had not been given Miranda warnings. Id. Esquilin continued to respond to ques-
tions, admitting that he was there for drug-related purpose. Id. at 317. Esquilin was then
given Miranda warnings and then made a full confession. Esquilin, 208 F.3d at 317.
96. Esquilin, 208 F.3d. at 317.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 319.
99. Id. Considering whether the taint of coercion has been dissipated is only necessary
upon a finding that the initial, unwarned statements were actually coerced. Id.
100. Id.
101. Esquilin, 208 F.3d. at 320. The Court stated that "it is part and parcel of the El-
stad holding that a failure to give Miranda warnings does not, without more, make a con-
fession involuntary." Id. at 321. Further, the Court noted, a subjective intent by the officer




made prior to the warnings, was presented to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Orso1'0
At trial, Orso sought suppression of all the statements she made,
but the district court denied that motion.14 The court of appeals
found that the questioning that took place in the police vehicle
was custodial, therefore the absence of Miranda warnings ren-
dered all statements made by Orso during the ride inadmissible.' 5
The court rejected, however, Orso's claim that her full confession,
which she made after Miranda warnings were given, should have
been suppressed.' °6 To reach this conclusion, the court relied on
the Elstad rule that the court should determine whether the ini-
tial, unwarned statement was actually coerced before determining
the admissibility of the post-warning statement.' 7 Orso argued
that this was an improper reading of Elstad and that she was also
entitled to the "fruits" analysis if the police used "improper tac-
tics."'0 8 The court rejected this interpretation of Elstad and, apply-
ing the Elstad rule, found that since her unwarned statements
were not actually coerced, her subsequent informed confession was
admissible.9
The purpose of the rule announced in Miranda was to prevent
involuntary confessions from being used against a suspect at
trial."0 To that end, the Supreme Court came to the correct con-
clusion that Patrice Seibert's post-warning statements should be
excluded."' It is easy to reach that conclusion based on the facts
103. 266 F.3d 1030, 1032 (9th Cir. 2001). Orso was arrested for robbing a postal carrier.
Orso, 266 F.3d at 1032. She was handcuffed, placed in the backseat of a car, and driven to
the police station which took between twenty-five and thirty-five minutes. Id. During the
ride, the investigators discussed the robbery with Orso and she made inculpatory state-
ments, including: "Well, if the letter carrier said it's me, then it must be me" when told she
had been identified. Id. Upon arrival at the police station, Orso was read Miranda warn-
ings, she waived her rights, and over the next hour and a half she confessed. Id. at 1033.
104. Orso, 266 F.3d. at 1033.
105. Id. at 1033-34.
106. Id. at 1040.
107. Id. at 1035.
108. Id. at 1035-36. Orso contended that Elstad's language of "deliberately coercive or
improper tactics" implied two circumstances in which the presumption of compulsion could
apply, not one. Id. at 1036 (citing Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314). The court rejected this reading
of Elstad and held that when read in context, "improper tactics" was meant to define those
police activities which render unwarned statements involuntary. Id. at 1036-37. Addition-
ally, Orso argued that the policy goal of deterring police misconduct was furthered by appli-
cation of the "fruits" analysis. Id. at 1036. The court rejected this argument as well, noting
that it was expressly rejected by the Supreme Court in Elstad. Orso, 266 F.3d. at 1038.
109. Orso, 266 F.3d. at 1039-40.
110. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2608.
111. Id. at 2613.
Vol. 43312
of Seibert. Seibert was placed under a custodial interrogation in
which the interrogating officer continually squeezed her arm and
repeated the same question until she confessed.11 This can un-
doubtedly be characterized as an intimidating setting that would
make someone who was not apprised of his or her rights feel pres-
sured to talk. After a short break, Miranda warnings were issued.
Seibert was questioned in the same location by the same officer
who made several references to their prior conversation without
informing Seibert that her prior confession was likely inadmissi-
ble."1 Most importantly, perhaps, was the fact that each time
Seibert made statements inconsistent with her earlier confession,
the interrogating officer immediately confronted her with that
confession in an effort to get her to repeat it."14 The interrogating
officer knew that the initial confession would not be admissible
because of the Miranda violation. His use of the unwarned con-
fession against Seibert, immediately after giving her Miranda
warnings, rendered those warnings ineffective and both confes-
sions involuntary.
At first glance, the plurality, concurring, and dissenting opin-
ions of Seibert appear to advocate different tests for evaluating the
admissibility of statements made after the administration of mid-
interrogation Miranda warnings. The plurality opinion seemed to
adopt an effectiveness test, under which the statements made af-
ter the mid-interrogation Miranda warnings would be admissible
only if the Miranda warnings were found to have effectively ad-
vised the suspect of his rights. 5 As noted above, the inquiry un-
112. Id. at 2606.
113. Id.
114. Id. When Seibert returned from her break and the second round of questioning
began, Officer Hanrahan asked her what would happen if the boys could not get Donald
Rector out of the trailer before it burned. Id. Seibert responded that she had not thought
about that and always assumed that her son would get Donald out of the trailer. Id. This
was inconsistent with her earlier statement that she knew Donald was supposed to die in
the fire. Id. Officer Hanrahan then asked, "Trice, didn't you tell me that he was supposed
to die in his sleep?" Id. Seibert then repeated that Donald was, in fact, supposed to die in
the fire. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2606.
115. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2610. The Court, in narrowing the issue, held that the perti-
nent inquiry under these circumstances was whether the warnings effectively advised the
suspect of his rights, most notably about his choice to remain silent or to give an admissible
statement. Id. Further, the Court noted that "in a sequential confession case, clarity is
served if the later confession is approached by asking whether in the circumstances the
Miranda warnings given could reasonably be found effective." Id. at 2610 n.4. If the an-
swer is yes, the Court can analyze the second confession under the traditional voluntari-
ness test. Id. at 2610. If the answer is no, then the subsequent confession is not admissible
if the first and second interrogations are realistically parts of the same questioning series.
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der this test can be reduced to a set of factors that are relevant to
the determination of effectiveness, regardless of whether the fail-
ure to administer Miranda warnings was intentional.'16
In Justice Breyer's concurrence, he wrote that the analysis of
the two-stage interrogation should be governed by a good faith
rule."7 Justice Kennedy argued for a similar test, but stated that
in the absence of evidence that the Miranda violation was inten-
tional, the admissibility of post-warning statements still should be
governed by Elstad."5 Finally, the dissenting opinion argued that
any statements made after mid-interrogation warnings should be
governed by the voluntariness standards of the Fifth Amend-
ment." 9
In practice, the effectiveness and voluntariness tests will oper-
ate in much the same manner as what will essentially be a total-
ity-of-the-circumstances analysis. The factors under the effective-
ness test are the same factors that would fall under the voluntari-
ness test espoused by the dissenting opinion. The voluntariness
test, which was advocated for in the dissenting opinion and which
Congress attempted to codify in 18 U.S.C. § 3501, would also ac-
count for whether warnings were given, in addition to the timing,
locale, and continuity of personnel elements of the interrogation.
The element of whether warnings were issued is present in the
effectiveness test because its very purpose is to determine the ef-
fectiveness of the warnings in rendering a suspect capable of mak-
ing a voluntary decision. Overlapping of the two tests is inevita-
ble.
As for good faith, it will likely not be central to the inquiry often
because in most cases the intent of the interrogating officer will
not be known. When it is known, as in Seibert, there is little justi-
fication for including it in the determination of admissibility be-
cause it would only have an effect on the suspect's confession if the
suspect was aware of the intent at the time of the interrogation.
116. Id. at 2612. Again, those factors include the completeness of the questions in the
first interrogation, the extent to which the two statements overlap the time difference be-
tween the two rounds of questioning, the location of the two interrogations, whether the
interrogator is the same, and the extent to which the interrogator treats the two interroga-
tions as continual. Id.
117. Id. at 2613 (Breyer, J., concurring). If the failure to give Miranda warnings was a
good faith mistake, unlike in Seibert, then the statements should be admissible. Id.
(Breyer, J., concurring).
118. Id. at 2616 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 2619 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
120. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2617-18 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
The struggle to balance the government's interest in enforcing
the laws and the individual protections granted by the Constitu-
tion is ongoing. The difficulty inherent in that struggle is that
those rights and freedoms provided for in the Constitution are
most often invoked to protect a person guilty of breaking the law.
But the law also mandates that an "adequate and effective" warn-
ing be given to a suspect to apprise them of their rights.'21 Since
Miranda was decided, there have been efforts by law enforcement
agencies and Congress to circumvent its protections and tip the
scale in favor of the government's interests. The Supreme Court
has remained steadfast, however, reaffirming Miranda time and
again. But with the growing war on terror and some of the con-
gressional actions in connection therewith, the need has perhaps
never been greater for a reaffirmation of individual liberties.
Patrice Seibert is guilty. She participated in planning the mur-
der of a seventeen year old, mentally challenged boy. She was
tried and convicted by a jury of her peers. Yet the Supreme Court,
correctly, invalidated that conviction because the case against her
was built upon a confession obtained in violation of her constitu-
tionally protected right against self-incrimination. Had the Court
found, under these particular circumstances, that her confession
was voluntary in the context of Miranda and the Fifth Amend-
ment, the possibility of further oppression and manipulation of
individual freedoms would increase. The government has a le-
gitimate interest in enforcing the laws of this nation, but that end
must never justify the means of a constitutional violation.
Mitchell W. Paterline
121. Id. at 2608 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467).
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